Liberalisation and the pursuit of the internal market by Dunne, Niamh
  
Niamh Dunne 
Liberalisation and the pursuit of the internal 
market 
 






Dunne, Niamh (2018) Liberalisation and the pursuit of the internal market. European Law 
Review. ISSN 0307-5400 (In Press) 
 
© 2018 Thomson Reuters 
 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in 
European Law Review following peer review. The definitive published version Dunne, Niamh 
(2018) Liberalisation and the pursuit of the internal market. European Law Review is available 
online on Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89188/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 











Abstract: Economic liberalisation operates both as functional process 
and disputed ideological touchstone within the pursuit of the EU’s 
internal market. This article evaluates liberalisation efforts to date, 
addressing both positive and normative perspectives.  It considers the 
meaning of liberalisation; discusses the legal instruments that exist 
within EU law; suggests explanations for its prominence; and explores 
the extent to which ideologically-oriented understandings of such 
reforms are reflected in the resultant character of the internal market.  
In doing so, the article aims to identify and analyse the deeper 
implications of the recurrent use of liberalisation as a tool of economic 
integration within the EU.    
 
 
 “…there is no alternative to the liberalisation process.”1 
 
I. Introduction  
Liberalisation plays a central role, as functional process and ideological touchstone, in 
constructing the European Union’s internal market. Although economic integration has been 
pursued through various means, few are as prominent or contentious as the iterative waves of 
market-opening and restructuring deployed to create and reinforce the single market 
structure.  Yet ambiguity exists about the extent to which liberalisation functions as cause or 
effect within the integration project.  Although posited as an “unavoidable consequence” of 
establishing the internal market,
2
 the prevalence of liberalisation efforts might equally reflect 
deliberate policy choices regarding the nature of the integrated market ultimately envisaged.  
The recurrent use of liberalisation as a means of market-building, moreover, has inevitable 
consequences for the contours of the emergent internal market.  
This article explores the substance of EU-level liberalisation efforts, considering both 
positive and normative perspectives.  A broad definition of liberalisation is employed, 
encompassing all efforts to reorient domestic markets towards the competitive paradigm, 
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including market-opening, structural reorganisation and privatisation.  The article examines 
how liberalisation is effected through EU law, explores potential explanations for its 
recurrent use, and asks how this might affect what we understand of the nature and purpose 
of the internal market.  Our focus is primarily domestic: beyond removing barriers to 
interstate trade, to what extent does the internal market project attack barriers to “the exercise 
of commercial activity as such,”3 and what implications follow?  
The question of causality—that is, whether EU law forces, or at least presumes, 
liberalisation—has particular significance, insofar as the concept brings marked ideological 
baggage, closely associated with so-called ‘neoliberalism’.4  Van Miert’s provocative 
characterisation of the EU as a dogmatic “liberalisation machine”5 captures a persistent 
scepticism about the methods and motives behind the internal market: namely, a concern that 
the EU liberalises primarily because it can—or, indeed, due to some deeper ideological 
imperative that it must—without directing sufficient attention to the question of why it does 
so, or the longer-term consequences.
6
  While such concerns are not new,
7
 the tensions that 
arise from the equivocal status of liberalisation as potentially both cause of and effect within 
the internal market link to broader questions about the EU’s current and future directions, 
particularly its renewed commitment to an economic union that simultaneously pursues the 
perhaps-divergent goals of prosperity, connectedness and social progress.
8
  Concurrently, the 
blue-sky thinking invited by the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe9 raises 
questions of whether liberalisation as a market-building mechanism will and should retain 
priority going forward.   
It is well-recognised that liberalisation policies might be defended by reference to 
either positive arguments regarding, for instance, government failure or pursuit of efficiency, 
or normative arguments involving, for example, economic freedom or political liberty.
10
  This 
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article combines both in order to explore how liberalisation, and the legal mechanisms 
deployed to achieve the iterative processes of market-opening and restructuring that it entails, 
might affect what we understand of the internal market.  The central contribution draws upon 
existing literature exploring normative understandings of liberalisation to identify five well-
established perspectives on its potential outcomes and impacts, against which EU-level 
efforts are measured and critiqued.  Although posited as rationales for liberalisation—that is, 
public policy-oriented explanations for its contemporary prominence—, these perspectives 
might equally be seen, more defiantly, as defences to its pursuit.  Section V considers the 
extent to which the notional benefits of liberalisation correspond to the characteristics of the 
existing internal market.  We ask, not only whether such advantages have been realised, but 
also whether these gains counterbalance more negative impacts of the liberalisation process.   
A further issue to be explored is the extent to which EU law and its institutions 
acknowledge and engage with the wider implications of the persistent recourse to 
liberalisation.  Conceiving of liberalisation as a normative phenomenon, going beyond the 
technical task of correcting market failure, emphasises the extent to which it reflects a 
particular underlying conception of the good.  Taken individually, discrete instances of 
liberalisation may be more or less successful at furthering the interests of consumers and 
economic operators, alongside the more intangible goal of integration.  Yet the wholesale 
embrace of liberalisation as a cornerstone of the internal market inevitably decouples blanket 
reform from specific market failures.  Thus, pursuit of a single liberalised marketplace itself 
becomes the ultimate objective, rather than more granular policy goals such as improving 
efficiency, increasing consumer access or choice, or challenging vested interests.  Moreover, 
as the range of potential beneficiaries above demonstrates, deferring to ever-greater 
competition primarily benefits those who stand to gain from the market process.  This being 
the case, we argue, for reasons of legitimacy the inherently normative choices reflected in the 
essential role granted to liberalisation within the framework of EU integration should be 
recognised and defended—an issue explored further below. 
The article is structured as follows.  It begins by constructing a workable definition of 
liberalisation (section II), and identifying and discussing legal instruments of liberalisation 
within EU law (section III).   We then explore its link to the political project of economic 
integration, considering alternative conceptions of liberalisation’s contribution to 
development of the internal market (section IV).  The central focus of the article comprises a 
wide-ranging exploration of the normative implications of the recurrent deployment of 
liberalisation in pursuit of integration (section V).  A brief conclusion combines these strands, 
 4 
assessing how such developments fit with the overarching concept of a social market 
economy (section VI).  Our intention is to move beyond one-dimensional notions of 
liberalisation as either descriptive process or ideological enterprise, in order to understand the 
deeper consequences that result for the emergent internal market.  In doing so, moreover, we 
aim to expose and interrogate both the reasons for and significance of what might be termed 
‘neoliberalism by misadventure,’ which, it will be argued, may provide the best 
understanding of the role of liberalisation in the internal market context.  
 
II. Conceptualising Liberalisation 
Liberalisation is a term frequently invoked yet rarely defined in legal scholarship.
11
  Despite 
considerable presence within existing EU law—from the Treaties,12 to secondary 
legislation,
13
 and the jurisprudence of the Union Courts
14—it is not a term of art.  It is 
therefore necessary to explore, first, what ‘liberalisation’ means, or might mean, in this 
context. To do so, we consider its existing understanding(s) within EU law, alongside 
theoretical literature which surveys its recognised ambit more generally.  The concept of 
liberalisation exists on two planes: both as a technical concept, describing policies and 
processes of market reorganisation, and, with a markedly normative dimension, reflecting 
views on the optimal operation of markets, and society beyond.
15
  While its normative 
understandings are explored later, our initial focus is liberalisation in this first sense, 
considering how such policies and processes effect restructuring of markets.
16
   
With inevitable linguistic variation,
17
 ‘liberalisation’ is referenced throughout the 







), with mention of ‘uniformity in measures of 
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 Arriving at equivalent conclusions about ‘regulation,’ see C. Koop & M. Lodge, “What is regulation? An 
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“libération” (arts.46, 58 and 59) and “libéralisation” (arts.60, 64 and 207).  
18
 Art.46(b) TFEU. 
19
 Arts.58, 59 and 60 TFEU. 
20
 Art.64(3) TFEU. 
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liberalisation’ under the common commercial policy.21  The Commission takes the view that 
the term refers, in substance if not expressly, to art.3 TFEU, by which the EU has exclusive 
competence in ‘the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market.’22  Yet there is ambiguity to its presence in primary EU law and beyond: is 
the term a proxy for free movement, meaning simply removal of barriers to trade between 
Member States, or does it imply reorientation towards the competitive paradigm in a more 
profound sense, thus mandating removal of barriers to domestic commerce, without 
(necessary) reference to inter-State trade?  
This question has been explored, most directly albeit without clear consensus, by the 
Advocates General. The key issue, as AG Tesauro observed, is whether development of the 
internal market is “intended to liberalise intra-[Union] trade or…to encourage the 
unhindered pursuit of commerce in individual Member States”.23  Typically, the issue has 
arisen in cases that explore the outer limits of the fundamental freedoms, and in particular, 
the contentious question of whether EU law should attack barriers to ‘market access’ as 
such.
24
  These cases thus disclose, in AG Bot’s words, “a latent conflict between…the various 
forms of economic protectionism in the Member States and…the concern…not to encroach 
upon certain areas of the Member States’ domestic policy.”25   
Two divergent visions emerge from the contributions of the various Advocates 
General.  AG Tesauro was ultimately unpersuaded that free movement aims to achieve “the 
greatest possible expansion of trade,”26 being particularly sceptical of the strategic utilisation 
of EU law by traders against inconvenient domestic rules.
27
  AG Kokott echoed such mistrust 
about the instrumental deployment of the fundamental freedoms by individuals to challenge 
national rules whose effect was “merely to limit their general freedom of action”.28  
Memorably, AG Tizzano invoked the dystopian prospect of a “market without rules,” to 
                                                 
21
 Art.207 TFEU. 
22
 See website of DG Competition at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/general/liberalisation_en.html (accessed 
04.07.2018). 
23
 Opinion in Ruth Hünermund and others v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg (C-292/92) 
EU:C:1993:863 at [1]. 
24
 See, generally, C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, 5
th
 ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
19-21, and D. Ashiagbor, “Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the 
Context of EU Market Integration” (2013) 19 European Law Journal 303, 312.  Contrast the alternative 
perspective of G.T. Davies, “Understanding Market Access: Exploring the Economic Rationality of Different 
Conceptions of Free Movement Law” (2010) 11 German Law Journal 671. 
25
 Opinion in Trailers at [75] 
26
 Opinion in Hunermund at [28].  
27
 Opinion in Hunermund at [27]. 
28
 Opinion in Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos (C-142/05) EU:C:2006:782 at [48]. 
 6 
demonstrate the dangers of attacking domestic regulation whose primary defect is to reduce 
the economic attractiveness of commercial activity, typically by narrowing profits.
29
 
Yet others have embraced readily the deregulatory potential of the internal market.  A 
provocative Opinion by AG Wahl opens with the uncompromising assertion that, “[t]he 
European Union is based on a free market economy, which implies that undertakings must 
have freedom to conduct their business as they see fit.”30  (A claim at odds with the “social 
market economy” language of art.3(3) TEU.)    A more nuanced yet still resolutely 
liberalising vision was offered by AG Jacobs,
31
 who argued for a default principle of 
“unfettered access to the whole of the [Union] market” benefitting traders engaging in 
“legitimate economic activity”—unfettered in the sense of unencumbered by domestic 
regulation, unless justified by Member States.
32
  The rationale for abandoning a 
discrimination-based approach is instructive: AG Jacobs focused on economic losses for 
individual traders and the EU economy stemming from intra-State restrictions, with little 
sympathy for “local” concerns that mediate against competition.33  The implication was that 
EU law presumes the existence of open, competitive and effectively unregulated national 
marketplaces, as components of the wider internal market. 
These contrasting viewpoints establish the parameters of any deeper claim that EU 
law is a force for liberalisation: that is, it prompts or compels reorganisation of domestic 
economies, over and above removing barriers to inter-State trade.  This raises a further issue; 
namely, what it is, more precisely, that liberalisation requires within national economies.  
Brief descriptions within the literature suggest a “transition to competitive market 
conditions,”34 the task of subjecting sectors or businesses to market forces,35 or simply, 
“opening to competition”.36 These high-level accounts prompt two related questions.   
The first is the range of market conditions that liberalisation moves from, and 
towards. Implicit is the fact that, initially, economic activity is constrained by obstacles to 
                                                 
29
 Opinion in CaixaBank France v Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie (C-442/02) 
EU:C:2004:187 at [63]. 
30
 Opinion in Anonymi Geniki Etairia Tsimenton Iraklis (AGET Iraklis) v Ypourgos Ergasias, Koinonikis 
Asfalisis kai Koinonikis Allilengyis (C-201/15) EU:C:2016:429 at [1]. 
31
 Opinion in Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA (C-412/93)  
EU:C:1994:393. 
32
 Opinion in Leclerc-Siplec at [41]. 
33
 Opinion in Leclerc-Siplec at [39]-[40]. 
34
 M. Armstrong & D. Sappington, “Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization” (2006) XLIV Journal of 
Economic Literature 325, 325. 
35
 D. Newbery, “Privatisation and Liberalisation of Network Industries” (1996) 41 European Economic Review 
357, 358. 
36
 D. Geradin, “Introduction” in D. Geradin (ed.) The Liberalisation of State Monopolies in the European Union 
and Beyond (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000), p.xi. 
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competition: whether structural barriers like scale economies, natural monopoly,
37
 or network 
effects;
38
 regulatory barriers that reduce efficiency by limiting participation, raising costs or 
creating rents;
39
 or characterisation of public services as non-market functions.
40
  
Liberalisation thus entails the removal or reduction of such obstacles, moving market 
conditions closer to the competitive paradigm.  
The second involves the processes by which liberalisation is realised.  Here, two 
contrasting understandings, narrow and broad, can be identified.
41
  The narrower 
interpretation encompasses efforts that aim, specifically, at “liberalising prices and access to 
markets which had previously been restricted by legal and regulatory barriers”.42  Typically, 
this includes only policies aimed directly at market-opening,
43
 like mandatory sharing 
obligations; removal of monopoly or special rights; and reform or removal of licencing 
conditions.
44
  The broader, and more common, interpretation includes all efforts at market 
reform, referring to a shift “from using public policy instruments, such as regulation or 
public ownership of enterprises, to a greater reliance on market mechanisms and incentives 
to pursue consumer welfare, industrial, regional and/or employment objectives.”45  It 







  Thus, while liberalisation is often a synonym for deregulation,
49
 the 
concept may be understood both less expansively—addressing only a subset of regulation 
pertaining to access barriers—and more expansively—including efforts going beyond market 
                                                 
37
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Restructuring Public Utilities for 
Competition (Paris: OECD, 2001), 8. 
38
 OECD (2001), 8. 
39
 Copenhagen Economics, Regulation and Productivity in the Private Services Sectors, Background report for 
Danish Productivity Commission, May 2013. 
40
 T. Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.1-2. 
41
 Adopting a narrow conception, see J. Clifton, F. Comín & D. Díaz-Fuentes, “Privatizing public enterprises in 
the European Union 1960–2002: ideological, pragmatic, inevitable?” (2006) 13 Journal of European Public 
Policy 736 (2006) and M. Florio, Network Industries and Social Welfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013).  Reflecting the broader conception, see Levi-Faur (2003); Prosser (2005), 99; and M. Pollitt, “The Role 
of Policy in Energy Transitions: Lessons from the Energy Liberalisation Era” (2012) 50 Energy Policy 128. 
42
 R. Gönenç, M. Maher & G. Nicoletti, “The Implementation and the Effects of Regulatory Reform: Past 
Experience and Current Issues” (2001) OECD Economic Studies No.32, 2001/I, pp.11-98, 12. 
43
 Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), p.40. 
44
 Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), p.17. 
45
 Gönenç et al. (2001), 12. 
46
 OECD (2001). 
47
 G. Hodge, Privatisation. An International Review of Performance, Westview Press (2000), p.14. 
48
 Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), p.18; D. Damjanovic, “The EU Market Rules as Social Market Rules: Why the 
EU can be a Social Market Actor” (2013) 50 C.M.L. Rev. 1685 (2013), 1705; and W. Sauter, Public Services in 
EU Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), especially chapter 4. 
49
 See, e.g., the interchangeable use in A. McGee & S. Weatherill, “The Evolution of the Single Market—
Harmonisation or Liberalisation?” (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 578; and generally, F. McGowan, “State 
Monopoly Liberalisation and the Consumer,” in D. Geradin (ed.) The Liberalisation of State Monopolies in the 
European Union and Beyond (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000), 212. 
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supervision, to affect, for instance, ownership structures.
50
  It is the broader understanding 
which is adopted in this work.  
 
III. Mechanisms of Liberalisation within EU Law 
How then is liberalisation, in this expansive sense of opening and restructuring of national 
economies, effected through EU law?  Consistent with the Commission’s stated 
understanding of liberalisation as reflective of the principles in art.3(b) TFEU,
51
 the free 
movement and competition rules comprise the central prongs of EU law’s mission to 
liberalise domestic markets.  Yet, strictly speaking, neither prescribes liberalisation as such.  
Accordingly, it is important to understand how the instrumental and sometimes strategic 
deployment of these provisions has facilitated their application to achieve a very particular 
vision of what the internal market entails.  We consider three key strands of EU law which 
underpin its liberalisation agenda: the substantive free movement rules; harmonised 
liberalisation legislation; and the supplementary use of competition law. 
 
(i) The Fundamental Freedoms as ‘Engine’ of Liberalisation 
The fundamental freedoms—guaranteeing circulation of goods, services, establishment, 
workers and capital—lie at the heart of the internal market project.  These obligations drive 
and condition liberalisation, as opposed to merely the creation of a common market, in three 
dimensions.  First, they provide background motivation for domestic reforms, establishing 
baseline obligations and generating supranational pressure for deregulation, structural 
reorganisation and privatisation at Member State-level.
52
  Second, the individual prohibitions 
provide a targeted weapon against discrete national policies that obstruct liberalisation.  
Finally, the essence of the fundamental freedoms is seen within the intellectual DNA of 
sector-specific liberalisation directives and vertical harmonisation regimes, which extrapolate 
specific obligations of market-opening and reform from the overarching goal of a highly-
competitive economy.
53
   
                                                 
50
 See also Koop & Lodge (2017) on understandings of regulation. 
51
 See fn.22 above. 
52
 F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.57-58, thus described the 
emergent “constitutional force” of the four freedoms. Clifton et al. (2006) similarly characterised such effects as 
the ‘European paradigm’. 
53
 Similarly, G.T. Davies, “Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of Contract” (2012) 20 
European Review of Private Law 805, 807. 
 9 
It is in the targeted application of the fundamental freedoms that the CJEU functions 
as “engine of integration”54—and, more contentiously, engine of liberalisation.  Three 
elements of the Court’s approach reveal, most obviously, a liberalising zeal.  First is its 
articulation of an extensive concept of “economic activity,” encompassing, inter alia, non-
profit and publicly-funded provision.
55
  The Court moreover adopts a rigorously objective 
perspective, which discounts that certain activities are considered immoral and/or illegal in 









 come within free movement, despite often-urgent objections of national 
governments.  Such cases thus coincide with AG Jacobs’ vision, whereby the existence of a 
marketplace for the benefit of traders and consumers is presumed by EU law, regardless of 
whether it accords with domestic mores or exists in fact.    
A second key development was articulation of the now-ubiquitous ‘mutual 
recognition’ doctrine.  Mutual recognition entails a presumption that, where goods are 
lawfully produced and marketed within one Member State, other national markets should be 
equally receptive, unless the host identifies legitimate and proportionate public interest 
concerns.
60
  The presumption of equivalence is essentially asymmetric: where different 
regulatory burdens exist, the trader must comply with higher standards only of domestic 
origin.  The burden of justifying any derogation rests with host States, which are subject to 
rigorous proportionality scrutiny.  The deregulatory quality of the doctrine is thus well-
recognised, reflecting a preference for private market autonomy over domestic regulation.
61
 
Moreover, reliance upon mutual recognition has further deregulatory impact by reducing the 
mandatory content of harmonised internal market rules.
62
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Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).   
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State for Health (C-372/04) EU:C:2006:325. 
56
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57
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159/90) EU:C:1991:378 at [16]-[21]. 
60
 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (C-120/78) EU:C:1979:42 at [8] and [14]. See 
also Commission, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the European Council 
COM(85) 310 final at [61]-[79]. 
61
 S. Weatherill, “Pre-emption, Harmonisation and the Distribution of Competence” in C. Barnard & J. Scott 
(eds.), The Law of the Single European Market. Unpacking the Premises (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), p.47. 
See also McGee & Weatherill (1990), 581. 
62
 McGee & Weatherill (1990), 583. 
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Third came adoption of the ‘market access’ approach,63  which moves beyond a 
concern with restrictions that manifest disparate impact for foreign traders or consumers.
64
  
Instead, market access concerns hindrances to commerce as such, which may have equally 
negative impact for domestic traders, but are considered inimical within open and 
competitive markets.
65
  Its deregulatory potential is well-illustrated by recent case-law on 
goods.  In Trailers and Mickelsson and Roos, the Court repeatedly condemned national 
regulation of product use, on the basis that such rules influence consumer behaviour to the 
detriment of purveyors.
66
  Such cases thus imply an apparent entitlement of traders to 
competitive domestic markets—indeed, to existence of domestic demand—, and not merely 
an absence of discriminatory barriers to accessing existing markets.
67
  In Scotch Whisky and 
Deutsche Parkinson, furthermore, the Court vehemently attacked domestic price controls, 
suggesting that any incursion into the freedom of economic operators to set commercially-
acceptable retail prices violates art.34 TFEU.
68
  Yet, where the criterion to identify obstacles 
to free movement is simply whether exercise of economic activity is rendered less attractive, 
practically all regulation becomes presumptively suspect: AG Tizzano’s disturbing “market 
without rules”.69  Outside the realm of goods, the liberalising thrust of market access is 
apparent in various—quite notorious—cases suggesting the superiority of free movement 




 and AGET Iraklis.
72
  Although Member States 
retain the possibility of justifying restrictions, scrutiny of derogations is exacting, as 
illustrated by the Court’s interventionist approach to proportionality in the price regulation 
cases.  Moreover, by requiring Member States to defend intervention, the default perspective 
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65
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Market” (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 611, 621. 
68
 Scotch Whisky Association and Others v The Lord Advocate and The Advocate General for Scotland (C-
333/14) EU:C:2015:845 and Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung eV contre Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs eV (C-148/15) EU:C:2016:776. See also A. MacCulloch, “State intervention in pricing: an 
intersection of EU free movement and competition law” (2017) 42 E.L. Rev. 190. 
69
 See fn.29 above. 
70
 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking 
Line Eesti (C-438/05) EU:C:2007:772. 
71
 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets 
avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (C-341/05) EU:C:2007:809. 
72
 Anonymi Geniki Etairia Tsimenton Iraklis (AGET Iraklis) v Ypourgos Ergasias, Koinonikis Asfalisis kai 
Koinonikis Allilengyis (C-201/15) EU:C:2016:972. 
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is of a free market in its most profound sense. “When pressed,” Snell observed, “the notion 
[of market access] may collapse into economic freedom.”73 
 
(ii) Liberalisation through Harmonisation 
Building on these conceptual foundations, liberalisation has been amplified by adoption of 
harmonised internal market policies, which require Member States proactively to engage in 
market-opening.
74
  It is Parliament and Council that function as formal decision-makers, 
although the seemingly-limitless enthusiasm of the Commission is reflected in skilful 
exercise of its right of legislative initiative.
75
  Although unexhaustive, harmonised 
liberalisation comprises an essential component of the EU-level framework, representing the 
clearest, most systematic and often most far-reaching efforts at market-opening and reform 
across the Union.  Moreover, although the existence of an expansive corpus of EU-level 
regulation belies any conception of the internal market as an exclusively deregulatory project, 
harmonised frameworks for subsequent re-regulation tend towards a minimalist vision.  
Such top-down policies divide, broadly, into three categories.  The first comprises 







 and Technical Regulations 
Directive.
79
  Such legislation has a liberalising quality, generally, by reinforcing the 
underlying freedom(s), and specifically, by creating EU-level hurdles to domestic enactment 
of obstacles to free movement.  The Technical Regulations Directive presents an example: 
Member States must inform the Commission of proposed regulations creating potential 
barriers to trade in goods, with a three-month standstill period which enables scrutiny and 
objection by the Commission. 
A second category comprises vertical harmonisation of specific legal areas,
80
 
including consumer protection, health and safety, and IP laws. Here, the EU is both regulator 
and liberator: often raising standards through minimum protections, but also limiting 
                                                 
73
 J. Snell, “The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?” (2010) 47 C.M.L. Rev. 437, 467. 
74
 See also Weatherill (2017), 148-50. 
75
 G. Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.147. 
76
 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 
77
 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1. 
78
 Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market [2006] OJ L376/36. 
79
 Directive (EU) 2015/1535 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
regulations and of rules on Information Society services [2015] OJ L241/1. 
80
 A thorough account is H. Micklitz, “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law” (2009) 28 
Yearbook of European Law 3. 
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domestic regulation through maximum harmonisation methods.
81
  This is particularly 
common in consumer protection, where EU rules circumscribe both individual commercial 
freedom and the residual power of Member States to further restrict such freedom.
82
  The 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive provides an example.
83
  Under the UCPD, Member 
States must prohibit a range of business-to-consumer commercial practices deemed 
automatically unfair.
84
  Yet, as a measure of full harmonisation, “Member States may not 
adopt stricter rules, …even in order to achieve a higher level of consumer protection.”85  
Accordingly, although premised on achievement of a “high level of consumer protection,”86 
the optimal standard is not ever-higher, but reflects a balance between consumer protection 
and economic freedom. 
A third category encompasses directives that seek, explicitly, to open specific markets 















 Three recurring themes are 
noteworthy.  First, apart from highly centralised
94
 or technical issues,
95
 legislation takes the 
form of directives under art.114 TFEU, which provide flexibility in implementation and even 
                                                 
81
 See, e.g., S. Weatherill, “Maximum versus Minimum Harmonisation: Choosing between Unity and Diversity 
in the Search for the Soul of the Internal Market” in N. Nic Shuibhne & L. Gormley, From Single Market to 
Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
82
 N. Reich, “From Minimal to Full to ‘Half’ Harmonisation” in J. Devenney & M. Kenny (eds.), European 
Consumer Protection: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
83
 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market 
[2005] OJ L149/22 (“UCPD”). 
84
 Art.5(5), UCPD. 
85
 VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV (C-261/07) EU:C:2009:244 at [52]. 
86
 Recital (5), UCPD. 
87
 Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities [2002] OJ L108/7; Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services [2002] OJ C108/33; Directive 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L108/21; Commission Directive 2002/77/EC on 
competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L249/21; and 
Directive 2009/140/EC amending Directives 2002/21/EC, 2002/19/EC, and 2002/20/EC [2009] OJ L337/37. 
88
 Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2009] OJ L211/55. 
89
 Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas [2009] OJ L211/94. 
90
 Directive 2008/6/EC amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal 
market of Community postal services [2008] OJ L52/3. 
91
 Directive 2012/34/EU establishing a single European railway area [2012] OJ L343/32. 
92
 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community [2008] 
OJ L293/3. 
93
 Directive 2009/12/EC on airport charges [2009] OJ L70/11. 
94
 Such as establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications under Regulation 
1211/2009 [2009] OJ L337/1. 
95
 Such as local-loop unbundling under Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local loop 




  Although competition is the ultimate objective, this is not 
contingent upon uniformity.  Second, because efforts involve sectors with persistent State 
ownership, liberalisation necessitates, as a baseline, removal of exclusive or special rights to 
ensure that markets are open to future entry.  This process is typically iterative and 
incremental;
97
 while, where restrictions on competition are unavoidable, for instance to 
accommodate universal service obligations, the inevitable privileging of providers must 
comply with the competition framework.
98
  Third, although responsibility for day-to-day 
regulation typically remains with Member States after market-opening, domestic discretion is 
constrained.  Most regimes require an independent national regulator, with recurrent use of 
good governance principles to steer decision-making.
99
  In purpose and function, therefore, 
EU-level coordination both limits the ability of Member States to restrict economic freedom 
in liberalised sectors and channels future regulation through harmonised frameworks—
neutralising and standardising functions discussed below. 
 
(iii) Liberalisation through the Prism of Competition Policy 
Yet domestic regulation is not the only potential obstacle to market competition: the Treaty 
framework recognises, though a suite of competition rules, that private restraints might 
similarly inhibit liberalisation.  Here, again, we encounter recurrent application of EU law to 
pursue and enforce the competitive paradigm within Member States, and not merely 
eliminate barriers to interstate trade—driven, in this instance, primarily by the enforcement 
activities of the Commission.  Such cases not-infrequently involve an oblique attack on 
national regulatory choices, moreover, blurring the boundary between public and private in 
the internal market. 
Most obviously, there is strategic deployment of antitrust against individual 
undertakings—particularly incumbent or former monopolists under art.102 TFEU100—to 
achieve internal market objectives.  Absent EU-level liberalisation, antitrust fills the gap, 
                                                 
96
 A contentious example is the diverging options for ownership reform under the Third Energy Package: see R. 
Boscheck, “The EU’s Third Internal Energy Market Legislative Package: Victory of Politics over Economic 
Rationality?” (2009) 32 World Competition 593. 
97
 In telecommunications and energy, the potential for effective competition has been progressively 
strengthened: compare the transition from Commission Directive 90/388/EEC to Directives 2002/19/EC and 
2002/21/EC in the telecommunications sector, from Directives 96/92/EC to 2009/72/EC in the electricity sector, 
and from Directives 98/30/EC to 2009/73/EC in the gas sector.  Post has seen an expansion rather than 
deepening of competition: compare progress from Directive 97/67/EC to Directive 2008/6/EC. 
98
 In the postal sector, e.g., Member States are subject to competitive tendering obligations even for publicly-
subsidised universal delivery historically undertaken by public providers: art.1(8), Directive 2008/6/EC. 
99
 Illustrated by the Airport Charges Directive, which establishes an EU-wide framework for charges at major 
airports, but does not dictate actual levels: see recital (2) and art.1, Directive 2009/12/EC. 
100
 Sauter (2014), 131. 
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empowering the Commission to address structural problems from behavioural perspectives.  
Beyond ad hoc solutions, recurrent enforcement can identify markets that require harmonised 
efforts, or generate political support for coordinated responses.
101
  Where markets are 
ostensibly liberalised, antitrust provides additional means of implementation.  Competition 
law has been applied where the Commission disagrees with national regulatory decisions,
102
 
or where the powers of national regulators are inadequate to address disruptive behaviour.
103
  
Enforcement can secure concessions beyond the scope of liberalisation frameworks,
104
 while 
domestic regulation rarely provides a defence to ex post scrutiny.
105
  Competition law thus 
becomes a “regulator’s regulator,”106 second-guessing domestic regimes while obliquely 
increasing the Commission’s powers.   
Beyond antitrust, liberalisation benefits from a complex interplay of competition 
policy instruments that constrain the ability of Member States to favour (ostensibly) private 
parties and thus distort the internal market.  State aid rules curtail the provision of economic 
advantages to undertakings, a significant limitation in liberalised markets where the State 
retains ownership interests or where cross-subsidies are required.
107
  The procurement rules 
limit the processes by which public authorities may purchase services, works and supplies.
108
  
Such restrictions are particularly relevant for public undertakings in liberalised markets and 
contracting-out of public services.  Art.106(1) TFEU prohibits distortive measures that favour 
undertakings with monopoly or special rights.
109
  The strength of this requirement in 
liberalised markets was reaffirmed in DEI, where special rights held by the former Greek 
electricity monopolist created inequality of opportunity in a supposedly open marketplace.
110
  
Likewise, the principle of sincere co-operation, in art.4(3) TEU, constrains domestic 
                                                 
101
 T. Soames, ‘Ground-handling Liberalisation” (1997) 3 Journal of Air Transport Management 83, 85-86. 
102
 See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission (C-280/08 P) EU:C:2010:603. 
103
 See, e.g., Orange Polska S.A., formerly Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. v European Commission (T-486/11) 
EU:T:2015:1002. 
104
 A notable aspect, for instance, of commitment decisions in the energy sector following the Commission’s 
defeat on unbundling: see, e.g., Commission Decisions in Cases COMP/39.315—ENI (OJ C352/8, 23.12.2010) 
and COMP/39.402—RWE Gas Foreclosure (OJ C133/10, 10.12.2009), and Boscheck (2009) 
105
 Deutsche Telekom at [80]-[82].  
106
 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 496. 
107
 T. Von Danwitz, “The Concept of State Aid in Liberalised Sectors,” EUI Workings Papers LAW 2008/28. 
108
 See Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts [2014] OJ L94/1; Directive 2014/24/EU on 
public procurement [2014] OJ L94/65; and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2014] OJ L94/243. 
109
 See, e.g., France v Commission (Telecommunications Terminals) (C-202/88) EU:C:1991:120. 
110
 European Commission v Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou AE (DEI) (C-553/12) EU:C:2014:2083. 
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policymaking that conflicts with market-opening and deregulation,
111
 insofar as this might 
prompt antitrust violations by private undertakings.
112
 
Outside the realm of ‘hard’ law, finally, the Commission engages in competition 
advocacy efforts to encourage and protect liberalisation.  This can involve pointed critiques 
of national rules, backed by an implicit threats of counteraction.  The energy sector, where 
the Commission has been consistently critical of regulated retail tariffs, provides an 
example.
113
  Words are matched by deeds, moreover, such as the Commission’s action 
against Poland for open-ended business tariffs.
114
  Alternatively, the Commission may seek to 





Several recurrent features and concomitant implications emerge.  First, although market-
opening and deregulation are not the only mechanisms available to achieve economic 
integration, liberalisation plays a prominent if not preeminent role.  We see default hostility 
to much domestic regulation, while harmonised regulatory frameworks tend towards a liberal 
model.  Second, pursuit of liberalisation expands the substantive reach of the EU rules 
deployed to achieve this goal: from the shift to an all-encompassing market access standard, 
to incremental extension of the liberalisation directives, to strategic application of antitrust to 
achieve market-making.  A third, linked implication highlights the distortions that may 
follow: from the critique of market access as a synonym for economic freedom, to the after-
effects of the instrumental application of antitrust.  Finally, liberalisation challenges the 
balance between the economic and social by prompting domestic deregulation, privatisation 
and marketisation, a concern considered further in section V. 
 
IV. The Interrelationship of Liberalisation and Economic Integration  
Beyond any simple conception of EU-level liberalisation as a technical phenomenon, 
however, a deeper question arises: how can liberalisation drive the integration that is among 
                                                 
111
 Pascal Van Eycke v ASPA NV (C-267/86) EU:C:1988:427. 
112
 Criminal proceedings against Wolf W. Meng (C-2/91) EU:C:1993:885. 
113
 Its Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, fn.1 above, at [1047], highlighted the “highly-distortive effects,” while 
the Commissioner for Energy declared that “price regulation must end where it still exists”: see Speech by 
Commissioner Arias Cañete at 30th meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum, Florence, 3 March 
2016. 
114
 Commission v Poland (C-36/14) EU:C:2015:570. 
115
 Commission, A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy COM(2016) 356 final. 
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the Union’s ultimate goals?116  Economic integration refers to governmental policies aimed at 
enlarging the economic space beyond national boundaries;
117
 marking a shift from the 
domestic to the ‘European’ in market forces and governance. Having established that the 
legal framework underpinning the internal market entails multiple dimensions of domestic 
liberalisation, it is appropriate to consider how these reforms link to the overarching political 
goal of integration. 
This question is relevant because it enables us to better understand the unresolved 
question of causality, which itself reflects the normative significance of liberalisation within 
the internal market project.  Is liberalisation so prominent within the EU’s ‘economic 
constitution’ because it is the optimal means to achieve the core objective of integration—or, 
conversely, is our understanding of the demands of integration and the character of the 
internal market shaped by the fact that policymaking is so frequently implemented through 
mechanisms of liberalisation?  In practice, a definitive answer that isolates a single 
motivating factor is likely to prove elusive, as explained further below.  Yet by exploring the 
question, “why liberalisation,” it is possible to distinguish between those potential rationales 
which explain such reforms in largely functional terms—as either the best or most achievable 
path to integration—and a more ideologically-oriented vision of the merits of the competitive 
paradigm.  While the extent to which the ‘end may justify the means’ is considered more 
directly in Section V, what concerns us here is to understand how the iterative and 
cumulative processes of liberalisation described above may be conceived of as contributing 
to the higher-level goal of economic integration. 
The first potential explanation for the prominence of liberalisation is instrumental: it 
provides the most effective—perhaps only practicable—means to construct a cohesive single 
market from disparate national economies and regulatory regimes.
118
  It is uncontroversial 
that liberalisation polices make a significant contribution towards construction of the internal 
market,
119
 and can be viewed as preeminent examples of ‘integration through law’.120  
                                                 
116
 Art.3(3) TEU reaffirms the centrality of the internal market goal—comprising, inter alia, ‘a highly 
competitive social market economy’—as a core Union objective.   
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 Scharpf (1999), p.45. 
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Weatherill (2002).   
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 See, e.g. van Miert (2000), 1; Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), p.24; Florio (2013), p.8; J. Glachant & S. 
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Beyond their utility in generating and reinforcing competitive forces between (and within) 
national markets, processes of liberalisation realise the complex objective of integration in 
two interlinked ways: neutralisation and standardisation.
121
 First, disparate national policies 
and market structures are ‘neutralised’: that is, isolated and broken down.122  Examples 
include elimination of special or exclusive rights, thus enabling new entry; vertical separation 
of integrated markets to avoid structural conflicts of interest; and removal of unduly 
demanding or restrictive regulation that inhibits entry.  Subsequently, liberalisation has 
standardising effect: by directing regulation at national level, reconstructed policies are 
streamlined and coordinated.  Although superficially re-regulatory, such efforts have 
deregulatory impact insofar as a plurality of national regulation collapses into a single 
regime,
123
 while reconstructed frameworks tend towards a laissez-faire model.
124
  
Taken together, from this perspective, liberalisation becomes the instrument of choice 
for the task of market-making,
125
 upon which establishment of the internal market is 
predicated.  Liberalisation may thus function as a synonym for harmonisation;
126
 as a 
particular form of Europeanisation;
127
 as the ‘destructive’ and ‘constructive’ forces of EU 
policymaking;
128
 or may even mark a break from “the Ricardian logic of diversity and 
comparative advantages” towards institutional convergence.129  Accordingly, liberalisation is 
not simply a question of increasing competition within discrete sectors, but implies expansion 
of the overall market, with a shift from domestic to supranational in participation and 
governance. 
                                                 
121
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A second explanation is pragmatic, emphasising the association between mechanisms 
of liberalisation and negative integration.
130
  From this viewpoint, liberalisation is the most 
attainable means to secure integration; representing the ‘path of least resistance’ within the 
constraints of the Union’s institutional framework.  The market-making processes that 
comprise liberalisation have both a negative character—removing obstacles to trade and 
undistorted competition—and a positive one—through reconstruction of a system of 
economic regulation for the larger unit.
131
  Yet it is the former with which liberalisation is 
closely associated, not least because of significant ‘behind-the-scenes’ contributions through 
the supplementary tools of liberalisation, which involve, predominantly, negative 
integration.
132
 The preference for negative integration within the EU’s constitutional structure 
has accordingly been advanced to explain the bias towards liberalisation within regulatory 
practice.
133
  Negative integration requires only a consensus or mandate to abandon existing 
barriers, avoiding disputed questions of what, if anything, should take their place.
134
  Its 
“surreptitious power” thus provides an easier route to outcomes unobtainable in the 
democratic arena.
135
  Liberalisation is the key driver of integration for essentially political 
reasons from this perspective: it is most easily achieved in a supranational context where the 
fundamental building blocks remain nation States first and foremost. 
A third explanation is ideological, reflecting some notion that liberalised markets 
present the best means to structure the internal market.
136
  From this viewpoint, market-
opening and reorientation towards the competitive paradigm constitutes the ultimate desired 
outcome.  This implies that economic integration is not value-neutral: that is, the internal 
market should not merely constitute a single integrated whole but moreover ought to reflect a 
certain vision of economic organisation.  Thus, liberalisation is pursued as an end itself.  This 
is illustrated by Thatcher’s ‘Bruges Speech,’ which advocated a very specific idea of what the 
EU should achieve.  In her view: 
[T]he Treaty of Rome itself was intended as a Charter for Economic Liberty…And 
that means action to free markets, action to widen choice, action to reduce 
government intervention.  Our aim should not be more and more detailed regulation 
from the centre: it should be to deregulate and to remove the constraints on trade.
137
   
                                                 
130
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The ostensibly depoliticised nature of the integration process—essentially an exercise 
in technocracy—is both acknowledged and disputed.138  EU policymaking is cloaked in 
economics, law and scientism,
 139
 which obscure the inherent—and potent—policy choices it 
nonetheless reflects.
140
  At its root, the determination to liberalise reflects community choices 
about organisation of society, and the respective roles of the public and private spheres.
141
  
The internal market is, moreover, a political construct, the nature of which is open to 
contestation.
142
  Accordingly, “the fallacy of ideological neutrality” has long been 
criticised.
143
  Despite a veneer of economic and social agnosticism,
144
 such heavy reliance 
upon liberalisation inevitably reflects “a highly-politicised choice of ethos, ideology, and 
political culture: the culture of ‘the market’” within the Union.145 
Yet the ‘ideology’ of liberalisation is complicated by the plurality of constituencies 
within the EU’s institutional and policymaking structures.  For certain political actors, a 
direct parallel can be drawn to an equivalent emphasis upon freeing markets domestically.
146
    
Conventional partisan politics are not decisive, however: the sense of purpose generated by 
the single market project should not be underestimated,
147
 while the rhetoric of “ever closer 
union,” though unnuanced, retains appeal.148  Even for apparently depoliticised actors, an 
enduring commitment to liberalisation remains evident.  The Court is considered to play a 
decisive role in determining what are essentially political issues, raising concomitant 
concerns about whether too much policy-making is left to the judiciary.
149
  The intrinsically 
deregulatory nature of its approach is beyond doubt, though not beyond critique.
150
  The 
Commission, similarly, has faced criticism for prioritising policies that entrench its powers, 
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and thus contribute to expanding the EU.
151
  Market liberalisation accordingly provides a 
focal point for regulatory activity, both as objective to strive for and benchmark against 
which to defend the Union’s jurisdiction.152  It is unsurprising that the supposed neoliberal 
excesses of the internal market are a key theme of contemporary Euroscepticism, one which 
persists despite conventional de-politicisation.
153
  Accurate or otherwise, the perception that 
the internal market is premised upon a radically liberalising mentality is prevalent across both 
scholarship and popular culture. 
These differing viewpoints—providing alternative, though not mutually exclusive 
explanations for the prevalence of liberalisation—have distinct implications.  The 
instrumental perspective posits liberalisation as intrinsic to the success of the internal market: 
to be realised effectively, economic integration at least benefits from, and perhaps requires, 
liberalisation.  The pragmatic perspective sets the bar lower: liberalisation—effectively a 
policy of laissez-faire—is merely what can be achieved within the internal market at present.  
From both perspectives, the wider normative consequences of liberalisation are, essentially, 
spill-overs from the integration process.  Although more negative consequences should 
arguably be anticipated ex ante, they are not sought proactively. The ideological perspective, 
by contrast, inverts any functional understanding of the relationship between liberalisation 
and economic integration: the former is pursued as optimal organisational mechanism for the 
latter.  Realising the normative consequences of liberalisation accordingly represents 
precisely the objective of the integration process.  Insofar as such effects as positively desired 
by policymakers, moreover, it is reasonable to expect that they should similarly be positively 
defended. 
Reconciling or deciding between these explanations would be no easy task, and this 
article does not attempt to do so.  Indeed, it is arguable that all three perspectives are 
reflected, to some degree, in current EU practice.  The functional rationales, in particular, 
offer credible descriptions of existing liberalisation efforts, yet both arguably beg the 
question by leaving unexplored higher-level perceptions of the implicit value of liberalised 
markets.  The ideological rationale, though compelling, is difficult to ground in robust data, 
and thus inherently speculative.  Our understanding of the motivations for liberalisation is not 
helped by a notable absence of engagement at EU-level.  Although there may be “no 
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alternative”154 to liberalisation, rarely do the EU institutions grapple with the distinction 
between liberalising trade and liberalising commercial activity more generally, an omission 
revisited below.  
Two important considerations nonetheless arise from the above discussion: the extent 
to which the wider normative consequences of any technical liberalisation process can and 
should be anticipated by policymakers, and the extent to which the overarching political goal 
of economic integration can be realised successfully by recourse to mechanisms other than 
liberalisation.  Thus, leaving open the perhaps unanswerable question of what motivates 
liberalisation efforts as such, we turn to the central concern of this article: the implications for 
the internal market which follow from a market-building process premised principally on 
liberalisation. 
 
V. Normative Perspectives on Liberalisation: the Shaping the of Internal 
Market 
As the preceding discussion foreshadowed, liberalisation is not, solely, a technical 
phenomenon. Indeed, debates regarding its merits almost invariably adopt a normative 
character; importing inherent underlying conceptions of the good that may, or may not, be 
furthered by competition.
155
  Normative perspectives on liberalisation are important because 
they help us to understand, in more socially-meaningful terms, what an ostensibly successful 
outcome would entail—thus better enabling us to determine whether, indeed, pursuit of 
liberalisation is defensible.  In this penultimate section, we assess EU-level efforts by 
reference to various well-recognised perspectives on the underlying motivations for 
liberalisation, asking both whether reforms to date have realised the perceived benefits of 
liberalised markets, and whether such advantages, in substance, comprise legitimate policy 
goals. 
The normative conception of liberalisation is susceptible to diverse understandings.  
Thus, while it may be taken to reflect a particular conception of the good, the supposed 
benefits are neither immutable nor indisputable.
156
  Drawing upon the existing literature, we 
explore five perspectives on the potential outcomes and impacts of the liberalisation process, 
namely: pursuit of prosperity through efficiency; liberalisation as deregulation; liberalisation 
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as impetus for privatisation and marketisation; economic participation as a standalone virtue; 
and consumer sovereignty.  Having sketched the parameters of each, we consider the extent 
to which the underlying normative perspective is reflected in the legal framework 
underpinning the internal market, either overtly or implicitly, and the practical and policy 
implications that follow.  Again, our focus is primarily domestic: to what extent and how 
does the internal market project generate relevant spill-overs that affect the make-up and 
quality of national economic and social spheres. 
 
(i) Efficiency, growth and prosperity  
The straightforward ‘textbook’ explanation for liberalisation is to enhance efficiency and 
improve welfare effects in the internal market.
157
  This is premised upon the perceived 
superiority of well-functioning markets as a means of economic organisation: the view that 
unencumbered competition provides better incentives towards efficiency and growth than 
governmental ordering.
158
  At its most trenchant, this may shade into ‘market 
fundamentalism,’ “the belief that markets by themselves lead to economic efficiency, that 
economic policies should focus on efficiency, and that distributional concerns could and 
should be taken care of elsewhere in the political process.”159  Although overcoming market 
failure constitutes a positive rationale for liberalisation in discrete instances, its wholesale 
embrace across the internal market assumes a more normative character.  The ‘carrot’ behind 
the iterative processes of market-opening and reorganisation mandated by EU law is thus the 
promise, ultimately, of longer-term prosperity throughout the Union.   
At least at a high level, establishing the internal market is considered a means to drive 
growth and increase overall welfare, both within individual Member States and across the 
EU.  Art.3(3) TEU lists as an objective, or potentially logical consequence, of the internal 
market, “the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth”.  Calls 
for intervention or restraint are increasingly couched in terms of explicitly monetary—and 
often fantastical-sounding—advantages.160  The express commitment to prosperity within the 
Rome Declaration of March 2017 reaffirms the connection between completion of the (fully-
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liberalised) single market and optimisation of efficiency and welfare effects.
161
  Notably, 
pursuit of prosperity is decoupled from that of “a social Europe”;162 although both are core 
goals, their separate existences suggest that enhancing overall welfare—a measure of total 
productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency—is a standalone concern, even if subsequent 
(re)distribution is of equal importance.   
Within the Court’s jurisprudence, the deregulatory implications of the market access 
criterion are broadly consistent with this objective, insofar as perceived ‘burdens on 
businesses’—a central preoccupation of neoliberalism—inhibit market participation by 
reducing expected profitability,
163
 and also diminish competitiveness.
164
  A “market economy 
operator” test is the baseline for permissible interventions under the State Aid rules;165 while 
the Commission decrees, unprompted by the jurisprudence, that Member States must 
introduce efficiency incentives for providers of state-funded public services.
166
  Höpner & 
Schäfer accordingly construe contemporary liberalisation as a means to achieve convergence 
of varieties of capitalism, an approach which, they argue, pushes European economies 
towards the liberal Anglo-Saxon model.
167
   
Yet the mechanical treatment of efficiency as principal determinant of prosperity in 
its broader sense—excluding, for example, socially-valuable ethical considerations—has 
been criticised,
168
 and the EU institutions do not draw rigid correlations in practice.
169
  
Inefficiency is tolerated most obviously—albeit restrictively—through derogations contained 
in the Treaties
170
 and developed jurisprudentially.
171
  Despite movement towards a ‘more 
economic approach,’ antitrust law prohibits not only behaviour that diminishes consumer 
welfare, but also which harms “the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as 
such.”172  While competitive markets often go hand-in-hand with efficiency, the Court 
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explicitly rejects any requirement of the latter to protect the former,
173
 thus endorsing (even 
inefficient) market participation as valuable in the context of European integration, as 
considered below.  In the realm of the fundamental freedoms, again the Court refuses to 
approach the benefits of market access solely in efficiency-based terms, for instance in 
ANETT rejecting arguments that obstacles to integration could exist only where consumers 
were denied cheaper products.
174
   
Perhaps the strongest indication that economic integration is not (merely) a means of 
enhancing efficiency, however, is seen in the tenor and approach of sector-specific efforts.  
Here, the considerable irony for those who critique EU-level liberalisation as a neoliberal 
phenomenon is that such efforts may be a source of considerable inefficiency within the 
internal market.  There is evidence, for instance, that blanket mandatory unbundling across 
markets with divergent characteristics—the preferred approach for electricity, gas and rail—
is likely to negatively affect competition and consumers welfare in a non-trivial number of 
circumstances.
175
 Similarly, efforts to liberalise postal services make limited economic sense 
where physical delivery is declining, non-economic considerations are prevalent, and 
experience indicates that viable competition is difficult if not impossible to introduce.
176
   
With clear indications that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for effective market-
opening,
177
 the focus of the liberalisation agenda is thus squarely upon building a distinct 
‘European market,’ rather than one that adheres to any textbook model of efficiency.178 
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Davies accordingly described the internal market as “an exercise in neither classical 
liberalism nor orthodox economics but in social engineering.”179 
 
(ii) A “market without rules”? 
A second question is whether EU liberalisation is an inherently deregulatory exercise, an end 
itself rather than the means to achieve effective integration.
180
  The conventional critique of 
regulation is premised upon, inter alia, an inefficient and presumptively captured regulator, 
whose interventions tend to deter rather than foster competitive behaviour.
181
  Liberalisation, 
from this perspective, frees the market to achieve more efficient outcomes, minus ineffective 
second-guessing by the state.
 182
  Yet the unsettling prospect of a ‘market without rules,’ 
where all human values are subject—and subservient—to the market, suggests the 
undesirability of unmoderated deregulation. 
For those familiar with critiques of Brussels bureaucracy as a never-ending source of 
‘red tape’183—or, indeed, Brexit-driven concerns that departing the internal market may 
facilitate ‘Mad-Max-style’ deregulation184—the notion that EU integration aligns with an 
ideological commitment to rolling back the frontiers of the State may appear absurd.  
Liberalisation, in this context, is emphatically not equivalent to deregulation in the public 
choice sense.
185
  Liberalised markets are often characterised most acutely by the breadth and 
depth of regulation subsequently enacted—typically originating at EU level, taking effect in 
domestic law—to govern the operation of ostensibly free markets.186  The internal market 
functions as an “empowering concept” for art.114 TFEU,187 prompting swathes of 
standardised regulation across a range of economic activities.
188
  Moreover, development of 
fundamental rights protections at EU-level, which constrain the substantive scope of the 
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Development of the internal market is, nonetheless, premised upon breaking down the 
regulatory boundaries of the nation State, integrating multiple entities into a single 
supranational whole.  There is, therefore, an increasing hostility to domestic regulation, 
encapsulated by the market access ‘slogan,’191 which at its most ambitious marks a switch 
from free movement towards free markets.  Whether this in fact reflects ‘neoliberalism by 
stealth’192 remains disputed.  Weatherill, for instance, rejected the convenience of the 
neoliberal critique, arguing that it misrepresents the focus of EU-level liberalisation, which 
principally:  
confronts the dead wood of centuries of regulatory tradition…[T]he Court is engaged 
in weeding out unrepresentative and outdated manifestations of national-level 
decision-making that are hostile to and inappropriate in an integrating European 
market….193   
 
The moderation implicit in Weatherill’s defence is not always borne out in the jurisprudence, 
however: although a valid critique of the idiosyncratic marketing restrictions in Cassis de 
Dijon, for example, it is difficult to recognise here the more nuanced and credible price 
restrictions in Scotch Whisky.  Accordingly, although domestic regulation, whether to further 
economic or non-economic objectives, is not irreconcilable inherently with the demands of 
the internal market, two structural asymmetries pull towards a deregulatory laissez-faire 
vision. 
The first is an asymmetry in the Court’s approach to review of the fundamental 
freedoms.  As discussed, much recent jurisprudence is premised on an assumption that 
domestic regulation intrinsically impedes market access, whether by altering demand patterns 
or diminishing incentives of would-be entrants, thereby shifting the focus of analysis to 
potential justification by Member States.
194
  Arguing that the equilibrium between (EU-
mandated) economic freedoms and (nationally-protected) social rights that underpins the 
concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ has become unstable, Schiek emphasised this inherent 
imbalance: national law and policy require positive and proportionate justification, while the 
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“deregulatory thrust” of the fundamental freedoms is accepted a priori.195  ‘The market,’ 
moreover, has less to lose than ‘the social’: a judgment accepting domestic restrictions 
permits other Member States to liberalise, whereas condemnation of domestic regulation 
prohibits all Member States from adopting or maintaining such rules.
196
  
Such unevenness, alongside the manifestly strategic nature of many domestic 
challenges taken by traders under the free movement rules, has occasionally caused unease 
for the Court.
197
 This was addressed most clearly in Keck,
198
 where the Court distinguished 
between rules that merely limit commercial freedom for economic operators, and those that 
make life more difficult for foreign traders, carving the former from the scope of art.34 
TFEU.  However, although the Court reaffirmed Keck, equivocally, in Trailers,
199
 the 
subsequent failure to consider the case in the factually-similar Scotch Whisky calls into 
question its continuing relevance.
200
  Other attempts to rein in perceived misuse of the 
fundamental freedoms, without resiling from the breadth of their liberalisalising implications, 
include rejection of cases where exercise of the relevant freedom was hypothetical,
201
 the link 
to the relevant freedom was too tenuous,
202
 or by reference to some (largely unspecified) de 
minimis threshold.
203
  Keck stands out, however, as an instance where the Court explicitly 
disclaimed an overtly deregulatory role.
204
  The retreat from this more modest vision cannot 
but bolster arguments that the fundamental freedoms, as currently approached by the Court, 
function as a deregulatory force at national level. 
Second, to the extent that EU law subsequently fills the regulatory void to protect 
legitimate public policy concerns, further difficulty arises due to an asymmetry within the 
EU’s regulatory capabilities between the economic and social domains.205 Social policy is a 
shared competence, although sensitive areas like public health and education lie primarily 
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  Yet the fact that the burden of financing social redistribution falls to 
Member States, which have divergent welfare models and resource availability, means that, 
in practice, EU-level intervention typically is limited to support for domestic efforts.
207
  
Moreover, as indicated by cases like Viking and Laval, discussed further below, in areas of 
public policy salience where EU law finds purchase, recognised standards of social protection 
tend towards the minimal.  Similar scepticism is seen in the emphasis placed, in re-regulation 
of markets following sector-specific liberalisation efforts, on the need to constrain national 
regulators.
208
 This creates a not-unjustified perception that EU law strongly favours 
(domestic) deregulation.  The well-intentioned window-dressing of the new non-binding 




Yet, an important bulwark against the menacing prospect of a market devoid of 
necessary rules continues to exist in the residual sovereignty of Member States, who may 
choose to regulate domestically despite outward incompatibility with internal market 
requirements.  Scotch Whisky illustrates this point.  In the face of significant scepticism from 
the CJEU, the domestic rules were nonetheless upheld by the UK’s Supreme Court, which 
took a considerably more generous approach than Luxembourg to the proportionality 
criterion.
210
  Thus, within the schema of the internal market, there remains scope for domestic 
intervention where required; what is more contentious, however, is who decides, and on what 
basis, when intervention is merited.  Moreover, even where national regulation is clearly 
incompatible with EU law, the default backstop of enforcement proceedings against 
offending Member States is a slow process, viewed as an option of last resort, and unsuitable 
as a comprehensive mechanism to guarantee domestic compliance with EU-level 
deregulation.
211
  Rather than a market without rules, therefore, EU policymakers may be 
required to decide between condoning national variation or imposing more complete top-
down harmonisation.   
 
(iii) The (nation) State in the (internal) market: privatisation and marketisation 
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Whether economic integration implies concurrent rejection of public ownership and service 
provision—and thus the State qua economic actor—is less straightforward.  Privatisation as 
an end itself is closely associated with a broader libertarian agenda.
212
  Clifton et al. 
described how “a new rhetoric and credo in the market replaced the post-war faith in the 
state,” with an assumption that “a change of ownership from public to private status would 
release enterprises from the shackles of bureaucracy and lead them via the cold winds of 
market forces to economic efficiency.”213  Beyond ideologically-charged revulsion with state 
enterprise,
214
 privatisation may be championed to enhance managerial incentives within 
public companies and/or increase competitive pressures.
215
  In the context of public services, 
‘marketisation’ similarly is presented as a means to achieve efficiency, affordability and 
choice.
216
  Yet both are deeply-disputed mechanisms of reform, in theory
217




Within the EU, the core question is the extent to which internal market norms are 
permitted to encroach upon the conventional domain of national welfare states.  By 
definition, the existence of welfare state systems implies a more hands-on role for national 
governments in economic and social ordering, particularly in areas of acute public policy 
concern.  This typically involves, inter alia, public ownership, public provision and/or public 
funding of key services.  To the extent such services also constitute ‘economic activity’ under 
EU law, however, a potential conflict arises with the liberalising forces of the internal market 
project, which, as discussed, assumes that such endeavours are correspondingly susceptible to 
open and undistorted market competition.   
Formally, EU law does not challenge the competence of Member States regarding 
nationalised industries or privatisation.  Art.345 TFEU declares that, “[t]he Treaties shall in 
no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership,” 
while arts.37 and 106(2) TFEU assume the lawful existence of “State monopolies of a 
commercial character” and “revenue-producing monopolies,” respectively.  Unlike certain 
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national jurisdictions, the primary driving force behind liberalisation is not any desire to 
effectuate privatisation.
219
  Moreover, in theory, development of the internal market is neither 
incompatible with the existence of national welfare states, nor determinative of their 
organisation.  Although art.151 TFEU nominally foresees an eventual harmonisation of social 
systems, the Court maintains that EU law “does not detract from the power of the Member 
States to organise their social security systems”.220   
Yet in practice, the logic of the internal market pulls towards privatisation and 
marketisation.
221
 Various explanations have been advanced: that corporatisation alerts 
Member States to the value of assets; that budgetary restrictions motivate indebted countries 
to sell; or that governments are inclined, when public monopolies are opened to competition, 
to shift risks to private finance.
222
  Much of what characterises privatisation beyond asset 
sales—including commercialisation of public entities, removal of subsidies, and contracting-
out
223—has become part and parcel of the wider internal market agenda.  This chimes with 
the notion of rolling back the boundaries of the nation State: in an ostensible single market 
where supervision is delegated to national regulators, it becomes important to limit ties 
between regulators and regulatees to curtail incentives for distortive behaviour.  EU-level 
developments might thus be construed as “catalysts or filters” that, obliquely, condition 
privatisation.
224
   
Three interlinked aspects of the overlap between the internal market and national 
welfare systems merit specific attention.  First, there is the question of public ownership, and 
in particular its relationship with free movement of capital.  Despite the nominal forbearance 
of art.345 TFEU, the extraordinary Essent case suggests a more proactive role for EU law in 
prompting privatisation.  Here, Dutch rules prohibiting privatisation of energy infrastructure 
were held to violate art.63(1) TFEU, regardless of the apparent leeway granted by art.345.  
Rejecting the urgings of its Advocate General—who argued that “the fact that no private 
investor may buy shares or interests in a company reserved for public shareholders…is 
precisely an element of the system of property ownership that the Treaty does not seek to 
change”225—, the Grand Chamber construed art.345 as merely a principle of “neutrality”.226 
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While EU law did not preclude, a priori, either nationalisation or privatisation,
227
 this neutral 
stance was insufficient to counter the positive obligation to remove impediments to free 
movement.
228
  The case might thus be seen as the logical inverse of Trailers: suggesting 
apparent entitlement of investors to a ready supply of potential assets, much as the latter 
presumed entitlement of traders to demand for their products.   
As a statement of the internal market’s attitude towards public ownership, the 
potential breadth of Essent is quite incredible.  The case should be distinguished from the 
‘golden share’ jurisprudence,229 which involved control of already-privatised undertakings.  
Although directed against an explicit prohibition on privatisation, the Court’s reasoning in 
Essent—that restrictions on alienation of capital arise from the mere fact that private parties 
cannot invest in public undertakings
230—is equally applicable to decisions to maintain State 
ownership.
231
  Public ownership itself thus becomes contrary to EU law, unless justified by 
Member States.  From this perspective, privatisation is the default status within the internal 
market.  The Essent decision, and its wider implications, are amongst the strongest evidence 
that the EU might indeed be a ‘liberalisation machine’ in certain instances. 
Second, the treatment of public monopolies—historically a vehicle by which national 
governments controlled provision of key public services and/or potentially harmful economic 
activities—evinces increasingly little discretion for Member States.  Sector-specific 
liberalisation has functioned to dismantle many of the most lucrative monopolies; although 
later efforts enjoy the imprimatur of Member State-approval through the ordinary legislative 
procedure.  The use of art.106(1) TFEU to extend application of competition law to national 
measures favouring domestic monopolists is well-established,
232
 and was reaffirmed 
forcefully in DEI.  In theory, under art.37 TFEU public monopolies are not absolutely 
incompatible with free movement, but must merely be “adjusted” to eliminate 
discrimination.
233
  Yet, the market access standard again appears to be devouring whatever 
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nominal domestic discretion remains.  In Läärä, an exclusive gambling concession 
constituted prima facie breach of art.56 TFEU, despite an absence of discrimination.
234
  In 
Rosengren
235
 and ANETT, the Court similarly found violations of art.34 TFEU arising from, 
respectively, Sweden’s alcohol monopoly and Spain’s tobacco monopoly.  In both, the Court 
excluded consideration of art.37 TFEU, taking an incredibly narrow view of what rules 
pertain to “the existence or operation” of state monopolies.236  Moreover, contra its deference 
in Läärä, in Rosengren and ANETT the Court concluded that the national provisions should 
not be exempted, because proportionate public interest concerns were not identified.
237
  What 
united all three was the contentious nature of the economic activity: in each, the product was 
socially harmful, so that the monopoly rights enabled the Member State to exert greater 
public control.  Yet such concerns, the validity of which is implicit in arts.37 and 106(2) 
TFEU, found little resonance with the Court.    
Third, EU-level requirements are particularly contentious to the extent they dictate, 
directly or obliquely, the conditions of service provision within national welfare regimes, 
particularly the allocation of resources.  We leave aside the Court’s generous reading of 
arts.20 and 45 TFEU, which extends coverage of national social systems to a range of non-
national residents,
238
 thus prioritising the inter-State dimension of social solidarity.
239
  Our 
concern instead is the extent to which EU-level liberalisation disrupts the financial balance 
within domestic systems, limiting the relevance of intra-State conceptions of solidarity.
240
  
The procurement rules constitute perhaps the most pervasive influence, constraining 
purchasing activity by state agencies.
241
 Public services are not immune from antitrust 
scrutiny,
242
 furthermore, although case-law recognises exceptions for sovereign
243
 or 
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 activities.  Consistent with its expansive approach to the concept of economic 
activity,
245
 however, the Court has few qualms about drawing equivalence between public 
and private provision in applying the fundamental freedoms.
246
   
A troubling area is healthcare, where finite public resources most obviously meet 
urgent human need.  Here, there is top-down liberalisation with the Cross-Border Healthcare 
Directive,
247
 which facilitates cross-border provision and patient mobility.
248
  Expansive 
interpretations of this legislation, however, have significant impact on domestic arrangements 
for public healthcare.
249
  In Watts, for example, the Court confirmed the right of a British 
patient to public reimbursement for unauthorised treatment obtained abroad to circumvent 
domestic waiting lists, even though she was ineligible to claim costs of care at home but 
merely direct provision under the (Beveridgean) NHS.  In Elchinov, it endorsed 
reimbursement for types of treatment unavailable within home Member States, again 
privileging, at public expense, the free-moving patient.  Petru involved a patient dissatisfied 
with the quality of care in her home State.  Although recognising an obligation to ‘shop 
around’ for higher-quality treatment domestically, the Court ultimately endorsed a qualified 
right to reimbursement.  Thus, a public good—healthcare—is reinterpreted as an individual 
entitlement, albeit still funded with public money.
250
  Although such cases have been 
applauded as prompting a ‘race to the top’ in public healthcare,251 this ignores the collective 
dimension of provision.  If Mr Elchinov and Ms Petru receive reimbursement for expensive 
German care as a right under EU law, this impacts upon the finite pot of money to treat the 
majority of patients remaining within the domestic system—and thus, almost necessarily, the 
extent and quality of care they receive.
252
  These cases thus provide a vivid illustration of 
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how liberalisation may lead to a “hallowing out,”253 or destabilising,254 of domestic welfare 
states.  
Such concerns are accommodated most obviously within art.106(2) TFEU, which 
allows ring-fencing of ‘services of general economic interest’ (SGEIs)—broadly equivalent 
to domestic notions of public services
255—from disruptive market forces.256  (Where the 
question is funding of public services, the Altmark criteria and exceptions to the State aid 
rules are also relevant.
257
) As a derogation, in principle art.106(2) TFEU should be 
interpreted strictly, so that economic activity remains, where possible, subject to internal 
market rules.
258
  A ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach has been rejected, however.259  The task of 
defining SGEIs is primarily a Member State competence, where they have significant 
margins of discretion,
260
 while flexible approaches are taken to proportionality.
261
  Yet 
art.106(2) nonetheless functions primarily as an exception to the norm of liberalisation.  
Rather than imposing top-down obligations regarding public services,
262
 it enables Member 
States to opt-out of elements of market-opening to achieve public interest goals.
263
  It thus 
endeavours to address concerns about inequalities unreachable through competition alone;
264
 
but does so by rendering such considerations extraordinary and thus outside the internal 
market.  This approach is therefore consistent with earlier observations about the default 
presumption of the existence of markets which underlies EU law.  Moreover, although 
art.106(2) makes broad reference to “the rules contained in the Treaties,” its application tends 
to be restricted to use as a defence for undertakings alleged to have breached competition 
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law, with little purchase vis-à-vis obligations of the State in free movement cases like Essent, 
Rosengren or Watts.
265
   
Accordingly, although EU law does not, in principle, challenge the existence of 
domestic welfare states, it places pressure upon direct Member State involvement in the 
internal market from numerous directions: from challenging public ownership and monopoly 
rights, to conceptualising public service provision as contestable marketplaces, to disputing 
the allocation of public resources from consumerist perspectives.  The Court’s disingenuous 
resort to neutrality in Essent thus sits uncomfortably with Weiler’s scathing attack upon the 
fallacy of ideological neutrality in this context.
266
  A façade of impartiality, resolutely 
indifferent to any distinction between public and private operators, constitutes in practice a 
favouring of the latter where the parameters of the plane within which both must compete are 
designed almost exclusively with private operators in mind.  Although EU law does not—
because it cannot—force Member States from the internal market entirely, the existing legal 
framework evinces obvious reluctance to allow them any substantive role.   
 
(iv) Economic participation as a standalone right 
Our fourth perspective considers the extent to which liberalisation champions individual 
economic participation as a virtue.  Schweitzer encapsulated this as: “the principle that 
economic opportunities shall be open to all.”267  Closely though not incontrovertibly 
associated with ordoliberal thinking on the imperative of individual freedom within the 
economic constitution,
 268
 this approach focuses on the experience of (private) market actors 
and the benefits they derive from the competition process.  Ordoliberalism is claimed to 
support a right for individuals to compete, free from political interference yet backstopped by 
strong State protection for open markets,
269
 thus segueing into competition as essence.
270
 
There is complementarity with consumer sovereignty, discussed below, insofar as each 
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prioritises the interaction between consumption and production that underlies any market; yet 
the participatory perspective turns the orthodox understanding of markets—that production is 
about means and consumption about ends
271—on its head.  Rather than fostering entry to 
achieve subsequent goals, like efficiency, this perspective derives value from the very 
possibility of participation after liberalisation.   
As Schweitzer described, the internal market is premised on an integral link between 
individual economic rights and European ‘general interest’.272  Under the fundamental 
freedoms, the language of market access emphasises the extent to which a core goal is to 
facilitate entry and participation by traders in markets across the EU.
273
  The crux of the 
integration concern is the extent to which regulation inhibits participation, whether by 
rendering it legally impossible or practically undesirable.  Moreover, there is a strong default 
assumption that, where a market can exist—that a product or service could potentially be 
provided for remuneration by private economic operators—, as a matter of EU law it should 
exist, so that derogations from the presumed norm of open competition must be justified.  
The starting point within the internal market is, essentially, that everything is for sale; or, put 
differently, a market should exist for (almost) any product or service that suppliers may 
conceivably wish to sell.
274
  We saw this in Trailers, where domestic regulation skewed 
demand patters, denying manufacturers a domestic product market to which they were 
presumptively entitled; in Essent, where public ownership denied access to a lucrative assets 
market; in Watts, Elchinov and Petru, where Member States were obliged to reimburse 
foreign medical providers outside domestic health systems; and in multiple cases rejecting 
claims of moral repugnancy to deny status as economic activity.  Josemans took the latter 
point to astonishing conclusion: although internal market law does not (quite) extend to the 
illegal drugs trade, it protects the right of purveyors of narcotics to market ancillary products 
like coffee.
275
  As discussed, moreover, participation need not be efficient in the sense of 
welfare-enhancing to merit protection: “[m]arket access is a policy of market opportunity, 
not a guarantee of market success.”276 Accordingly, “economic liberties for 
entrepreneurs”277 have independent value. 
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Few cases illustrate this with such potency as the much-criticised duo of Viking and 
Laval. Both concerned trade union strikes to enforce labour standards against service 
providers seeking to make use of cheaper workforce from other Member States.  In each, the 
Court construed collective action as contrary to free movement, focusing squarely on the 
employer perspective.  In Viking, this meant a concern that a ferry-operator would decline to 
re-flag its vessel, that is, exercise its freedom of establishment.
278
  In Laval, the higher wages 
demanded rendered service provision “less attractive” for the employer, similarly an oblique 
obstacle to market participation.
279
  The pivotal concern in each was the knock-on negative 
effects for traders, which the Court posited as contrary to the economic freedom protected 
within the internal market. Little attention was directed towards arguably more compelling 
collective action/social dumping concerns,
280
 and in Laval, the Court even declared, 
precipitously, that strike action was unjustifiable.
281
  Both cases therefore demonstrate the 
force, but also potential illogicality, of the participatory understanding of the internal market. 
Implicit in Viking and Laval, but also cases as diverse as Essent and Scotch Whisky, is 
the fact that a focus on individual participation, even if couched in the most inclusive terms, 
conflicts with a more collective vision of integration.  From the latter perspective, individual 
economic rights are inherently ‘selfish,’ and at odds with wider public interest.282 Hints of 
such concerns arguably lie at the heart of Keck: a fear that individual traders were being 
empowered to ride roughshod over national rules, enacted to further public policy goals, to 
advance private self-interest.  Indeed, private litigants are described as motors of the internal 
market,
283
 exercising a strategic function which may partly explain the centrality of the role 
afforded to them.  Within an ostensible social market economy, a disproportionate emphasis 
on private autonomy once again risks destabilising the notional balance between the 
individual and the collective.
284
  Although the extent to which internal market law can be said 
always to prioritise individual participation is debatable,
285
 its strong underlying protection 
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for private economic freedom is consistent with a minimalist liberal vision, in which 
solidarity not-infrequently yields to individual self-determination.  
 
(v) Consumer sovereignty 
Our final perspective conceives of liberalisation as enhancing consumer choice, and thereby 
bolstering consumer sovereignty.
286
  It is not merely economic actors meaning producers and 
suppliers which benefit from market participation; consumers, too, gain from engagement.  
Market-opening drives innovation and strengthens competitive dynamics, placing consumers 
in a stronger position to assert power over quality and price.
287
  This perspective is thus 
premised upon some rebalancing of the benefits of the market process to advantage 
consumers at the expense of traditionally-dominant producers.
288
  To secure this, greater 
levels of state involvement may be tolerated even within liberalised markets.
289
   
The legal framework underpinning the internal market recognises a central role for 
consumers: “[i]t is important that not only commerce as such but also private persons who 
happen to be conducting an economic transaction across national frontiers should be able to 
enjoy the benefits”.290  The consumer is empowered and protected to participate,291 on the 
basis that consumer welfare is better served by liberalisation and competition than by 
exclusionary local regulatory practices.
292
  The flipside is that consumers take a non-
negligible degree of personal responsibility.  The average consumer is assumed to be 
“reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect,”293 an arguably 
unrealistic standard.
294
  Caixa-Bank illustrates the trade-off: here, the Court rejected 
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consumer protection justifications for the prohibition of remuneration of certain types of bank 
account, deemed necessary to maintain free banking services, on the basis that consumers 
would derive greater benefit from greater choice.
295
  It is instructive to contrast Watts, in 
which Mrs Watts qua consumer prevailed against the NHS, with FENIN,
296
 where claims by 
unpaid suppliers of the Spanish health service fell outside the protection of competition law.  
The Court in FENIN specifically rejected arguments that the obviously commercial nature of 
sales from the perspective of suppliers was relevant to the scope of art.102 TFEU;
297
 yet 
when faced with conceptually-similar concerns in Watts, the Court had few qualms about 
prioritising Mrs Watts’ consumerist preferences.298  
Beyond the fundamental freedoms, much of the positive integration framework 
advancing consumer protection is concerned overtly with re-regulation of national markets,
299
 
although even here preserving “the competitiveness of enterprises” remains a central 
concern.
300
  Improving outcomes from a consumer perspective is nonetheless a key theme of 
harmonised liberalisation legislation.  The Services Directive, for instance, includes 
numerous clauses aimed at enhancing provision for recipients,
301
 while the revised Energy 
Directives emphasise protection of vulnerable consumers.
302
  A commitment to consumer 
sovereignty is also central to antitrust law: “enforcing competition law ensures that there is a 
voice for the consumers.”303  Consumer choice is thus expressly recognised as a pivotal 
benefit of open and competitive markets.
304
  Where economic activity restricts competition to 
consumer disadvantage but enhances overall efficiency, moreover, the latter counterbalances 
the former only where consumers receive a fair share of resulting benefits.
305
  Accordingly, 
the internal market is not merely concerned with maximising total wealth; at least outwardly, 
consumer surplus is relevant, meaning that it matters how advantages of liberalisation are 
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distributed.  Commentators query, however, whether liberalisation efforts succeed in 
delivering a ‘consumer dividend’.306   
Yet a consumer sovereignty perspective, as interpreted in the EU, again contrasts with 
redistributive or solidarity-based conceptions of markets as, principally, “servants of the 
state’s values”.307  In Scotch Whisky, the peremptory dismissal of minimum pricing neglected 
the well-evidenced fact that, in alcohol markets, lower prices counterintuitively diminish 
welfare by generating greater levels of alcohol-related harms.
308
  In Deutsche Parkinson, the 
Court invoked dubious and speculative reasoning regarding the capacity of online pharmacies 
to service vulnerable customers.
309
  Watts, Elchinov and Petru pitted the preferences of 
individual patients against the collective organisation and resource limitations of their 
national health systems.  There is little sense in these cases that individual consumers are 
members of a broader community, in which non-economic or collective concerns should 
sometimes take priority.
310
  Even in antitrust, where the Commission has a renewed—and 
contentious
311—commitment to ‘fairness’ as motivating value, this ultimately boils down to 
ensuring that “markets stay competitive enough to give consumers the power to demand a fair 
deal.”312 
Accordingly, such approaches are vulnerable to critiques of liberalisation as involving 
the imposition of a market society model upon public life, whereby citizenship is reduced to 
mere consumption of economic benefits and rights.
313
  Such a perspective contrasts with one 
premised on social solidarity, whereby the state has inherent responsibility to ensure equal 
treatment regardless of resources.
314
  Prosser thus argued against a consumerist vision of 
citizenship because “we do not come to the market as equals,” meaning the theory is 
essentially non-egalitarian.
315
  Greater emphasis on consumer sovereignty may enhance the 
absolute level of choice; but, absent some redistributive mechanism outside the purview of 
the market, it does little to attenuate existing inequality in the abilities of consumers to 
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participate and gain advantages.  Even what is perhaps the most inclusive normative 
conception of liberalisation therefore continues to tolerate existing inequality, while arguably 
reinforcing a markedly narrow, defiantly liberal understanding of the citizen’s role within the 
internal market. 
 
(vi) Positive implications of normative assessment 
Accordingly, the liberalisation process and resulting market structures are largely an exercise 
in compromise: between the domestic and supranational in terms of regulatory governance; 
between the archetype of ‘open and undistorted competition’ and reality of market failures; 
and between those who stand to benefit from greater competition and those who lose out.  
Sauter posits a balance between preferences of ‘liberal’ Member States, reflected in the 
fundamental freedoms and competition rules, and ‘statist’ Member States, reflected in 
derogations from market rules and protections for SGEIs.
316
  Yet the adequacy of this 
settlement remains contested.  From an economic perspective, any space for national interests 
within the liberalisation agenda risks fragmenting the single market.
317
  From socially-
oriented perspectives, the decoupling of market reform from public policy concerns is 
inherently unrealistic.
318
  It is unfair to suggest that the internal market is unequivocally or 
unavoidably a neoliberal construct.  Yet by relying so heavily on liberalisation to clear the 
way, the integration process necessarily promotes and perhaps privileges free market-oriented 
perspectives.  Whether such an outcome merits critique in substance is an inherently 
subjective question: to what extent are open and unencumbered markets ‘good’ for society, 
either themselves or compared with alternatives that might otherwise exist?   
For reasons of legitimacy, however, there needs to be more direct and detailed 
engagement at EU-level with both the rationale for liberalisation as agent of integration and 
its consequences in practice, desirable or otherwise.  Even if one accepts that the internal 
market does not mandate liberalisation as such—but rather, perhaps, merely presupposes its 
existence—the existing legal framework that underpins it leans strongly and unabashedly 
towards a default position of open and unencumbered competition.  Yet, as others have 
observed, such an approach is compelled by neither the EU’s constitutional structure nor the 
black-letter of its primary laws.
319
  In reality, liberalisation is not the inexorable solution to 
market failure, nor does it reflect the only or indeed necessarily the optimal understanding of 
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what is demanded by the legal framework that underpins the internal market.  Adoption of 
the market access standard by the Court, for instance; of mandatory unbundling policies for 
public utilities by the Council and Parliament; or of the necessity of efficiency incentives to 
justify State aid to public service providers by the Commission: none of these interpretations 
of the internal market rules was inevitable, but instead each represents a deliberate policy 
decision to advance the competitive paradigm.      
This reflects, unavoidably, distinct normative claims about optimal social and 
economic organisation within the internal market, over and above positive arguments 
regarding the need for intervention to correct market failure in discrete instances.  The 
available empirical evidence is hugely mixed as to when and why liberalisation generates 
benefits: in short, ‘it depends,’ varying with market circumstances and means utilised.320  
Thus, the contention that EU-level liberalisation is aimed at poor quality national regulation 
enacted to further vested interests may well be true in certain instances.
321
  To the extent that, 
within the internal market, “[t]here is no alternative to the liberalisation process,”322 
however, such a position is more ideological than technocratic.  While it is not our intention 
to direct an indiscriminate attack at the liberalisation efforts that have helped to develop and 
shape the internal market as it exists today, this process cannot be legitimate—and thus 
arguably should not continue—unless and until these normative claims are at least 
acknowledged and defended. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
This article has surveyed the principal means by which liberalisation is effected in the EU, 
alongside the implications that arise for the evolving internal market.  Liberalisation 
processes comprise both negative and positive integration, involving direct legislation and 
supplementary law enforcement, embedded and enriched by jurisprudential innovation.  The 
resultant marketplace prioritises equality of access, open competition, efficiency-enhancing 
behaviour (mostly) and a reduced role for nation States.  Yet the regulatory framework says 
little about the social dimension of integration, thus exposing the EU to forceful critiques as 
an essentially neoliberal project.  Purely functional accounts of liberalisation—that it is 
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achieved because it can be achieved—are increasingly inadequate.  On the one hand, EU-
level efforts push ever-deeper into the realm of the domestic and the social. On the other, the 
EU finds itself at a political cross-road, where its superiority and relevance are no longer a 
given.
323
  Liberalisation has proven a readily achievable means of integrating markets, yet 
this conclusion means little unless we understand its significance to the broader project of 
economic and even political integration. 
 Thus, returning to our alternative accounts of the relationship between liberalisation 
and integration, it seems undisputable that, generally speaking, liberalisation provides an 
effective technique for breaking down barriers between national markets, by neutralising and 
standardising domestic regulation.  Yet its use generates a notably pared-back vision of what 
the internal markets entails and permits, making it a decidedly lopsided beast.  The pragmatic 
reliance upon negative integration mechanisms has, moreover, arguably anointed 
liberalisation with an autonomous or self-perpetuating quality: the fact that this is what can 
be achieved somehow transformed into an imperative that it is what must be achieved.  
Whether the latter indicates an implicit ideological commitment to a fully-liberalised internal 
market—liberalisation as an end itself—remains open to dispute.  The preponderance of 
evidence supports the contention that liberalisation has been the primary tool of internal 
market-building, and, certainly, aspects of its development would suggest a strong preference 
for contestable, competitive and indeed privatised markets as the archetype.  Yet, ultimately, 
existing evidence is insufficient to substantiate the more definitive proposition that market 
liberalisation is an affirmative goal within the integration process, though its approach is 
largely consistent with such an objective. 
Arguably, the absence of clarity on this issue reflects an absence of political 
ownership over the project of economic integration more broadly.  Given our starting 
observation that liberalisation reflects a particular underlying conception of the good, the EU 
appears to still lack a political authority which can legitimately and effectively adopt it as a 
core policy.  Yet there is a significant risk that, though its recurrent use, liberalisation may be 
perceived as a synonym for integration—with the attendant implication that, because 
integration is an on-going and iterative process, there is “no alternative” but to pursue 
liberalisation in furtherance.  This is not so much neoliberalism by stealth, perhaps, as by 
misadventure; yet even if inadvertent, it reveals an ideological commitment to free markets.  
By nonetheless prioritising the economic without granting due weight to socially-valuable 
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non-economic goals within the ‘visible’ corpus of liberalisation efforts, the EU legal 
framework might thus be accused of furthering a partisan and normatively-loaded vision of 
society, one which goes beyond the parameters of its legitimate mandate.
324
  While economic 
integration is primarily about enlarging the economic space beyond national boundaries, this 
high-level goal cannot grant EU institutions carte blanche to dictate the qualitative nature of 
the ensuing marketplace and its wider social implications. 
Absent clear political endorsement and defence of liberalisation, therefore, aspects of 
the current framework are vulnerable to critique.  These include the implicit assumption that 
all human activity should be susceptible to the market; that within the marketplace the rights 
of traders are paramount; that domestic interventions are inherently suspect; and that there is 
little difference between public and private in the realm of economic activity.  The fiction of 
neutrality is all the more disingenuous, and even destructive, because of structural 
asymmetries between advancement of economic and social interests that exist within the 
internal market structure.  The weakness of the European Social Pillar, merely an aspirational 
‘compass’ for renewed social protection that must face-off against the bulldozer of market 
access, places this concern in sharp focus.
325
  The very concept of market failure, exposing 
the limits of the competitive paradigm, illustrates how liberalisation alone is an inadequate 
vehicle for integration.  Yet social considerations remain largely outside the purview of the 
internal market: viewed with scepticism, they are treated as derogations which are the 
responsibility of Member States to defend and protect.  Such an approach, both as a matter of 
principle and practice, distorts our understanding of what a social market economy entails, 
fuelling the more normatively-charged, problematical perspectives on liberalised markets 
discussed in the preceding section.  Accordingly, ‘neoliberalism by misadventure’ may 
escape the most vitriolic critiques of neoliberalism as an ideological enterprise, yet it 
nonetheless supports a highly debatable and somewhat disturbing conception of the perceived 
aims and optimal outcomes of the economic integration process.  
The resulting perception that the EU is irredeemably, unrepentantly focused on the 
pursuit of free markets has the unnecessary effect of alienating many constituencies that 
should celebrate its successes, a feature of popular critiques today.  In considering 
alternatives to liberalisation as a motor of economic integration, it is necessary acknowledge 
what might be deemed its comparative advantages in this task.  Yet such recognition is 
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neither a steadfast policy prescription for liberalisation, nor should it legitimate an integration 
process that results, in effect, in surreptitious economic—or even social—ordering.  As the 
EU embarks on an overdue period of soul-searching with respect to its future evolution, it is 
an opportune time to consider the implications of an integration process that has, to date, 
adhered closely to a neoliberal model—and to ask whether, going forward, this remains the 
optimal vision for an integrated, innovative and inclusive internal market. 
